Art, Mysticism, and the Other: Kristeva’s Adel and Teresa by Miller, Elaine P.
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVI, No 2 (2018)  |  www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2018.857 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No 
Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 
This journal is operated by the University Library System of the University of Pittsburgh 
as part of its D-Scribe Digital Publishing Program, and is co-sponsored by the 
University f Pittsburgh Press 
Art, Mysticism, and the Other 
Kristeva’s Adel and Teresa 
Elaine P. Miller 
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy - Revue de la philosophie 
française et de langue française, Vol XXVI, No 2 (2018) pp. 43-55 
Vol XXVI, No 2 (2018) 
ISSN 1936-6280 (print) 
ISSN 2155-1162 (online) 
DOI 10.5195/jffp.2018.857 
www.jffp.org 
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVI, No 2 (2018)  |  www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2018.857 
Art, Mysticism, and the Other 
Kristeva’s Adel and Teresa 
Elaine P. Miller 
Miami University 
 
In her recent essay "The Body of Adel," called a "conversation," but 
actually a one-sided address to the Algerian contemporary artist Adel 
Abdessemed, Julia Kristeva begins by remarking that the image, emerging 
from its traditional role as an imprint or receptacle of the sacred, has become, 
through the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the eventual secularization of 
the Enlightenment, a kind of social space, one not completely severed from its 
sacred origin.  Today, she writes, artists, those "extravagant manipulators of 
the visible," are able better than religion to evoke the exhilarations, fears, and 
daydreams of contemporary humans in "splinters of divinity hearkening back 
to the source."1  
In writing this Kristeva says she is reminded of her reading of Hannah 
Arendt in the third volume of her "Feminine Genius" trilogy, in particular her 
discussion of Arendt's use of Kant's aesthetic conception of the sensus 
communis to conceptualize a possible political philosophy.  In particular, she 
recalls Arendt's dream of a political space analogous to a crowd emerging 
from a concert.  Each audience member has incorporated the work in their 
own singular fashion, and yet, they come together to communicate about it.  
Kristeva calls this an "effervescence of thought" in which the singular ideas 
come together but do not melt into a homogenizing totality.2  
Taste, as Arendt and Kristeva read it, has something ineluctably singular 
and bodily about it, to a greater extent than any other of the senses.  Kant 
himself talks about taste not only in terms of the appreciation of the beauty of 
nature or of art, but also of a delicious dinner.  Kristeva reads Kantian taste in 
contradistinction to Hegel, for whom digestion signfied the overcoming of 
singularity.  The singular in aesthetic judgment remains distinct, even as it 
enters into dialogue with other singularities. 
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Kristeva's "The Body of Adel" is a piece about one artist, but also about 
the body, and specifically the animal body, individuated to a greater extent 
than in any other of her works. As artist and as beast, in addition to energetic 
pulsion and fluctuating drive, "the body of Adel" is a fascinating, alluring, but 
equally othered body; one might even say it is the counterpart to the abject 
body in Powers of Horror. In its sometimes uncomfortable proximity to the 
nonhuman animal, his is a body inflected by racial stereotypes.  This piece on 
Adel Abdessemed might recall a chapter in another of Kristeva's works, 
where she engages with the concept of the non-western foreign.  That we are 
"strangers to ourselves," refers not just to the unconscious mind within each 
human, but also to the foreigner, specifically the exotic other from the East 
that she discusses with reference to orientalist tales by Voltaire and 
Montesquieu.  She writes to Adel: "I recognize in you the uprootedness 
(arrachement) of the foreigner," …"I travel myself."3  
Kristeva's Teresa My Love, also one of her more recent published writings, 
appears to concern a very different subject matter, namely, the life and 
thought of a 16th century Spanish mystic, written in the form of a novel.  Yet 
the theme of another kind of foreigner, equally exotic but this time 
threatening, pops up unexpectedly and disappears several times during the 
course of the novel.  At the very beginning of the story, the 21st century 
narrator, psychoanalyst Sylvia Leclerque, is present at a meeting where 
different representatives are guiding a lawmaker through a discussion of 
France's constitutional secularism.  Abruptly, a young woman in a headscarf, 
whom Kristeva describes as an IT engineer, speaks out, explaining that "she 
and her God were one and that the veil was the immovable sign of this 'union,' 
which she wished to publicize in order to definitively 'fix it' in herself and in 
the eyes of others."  This statement interrupts and yet reflects Leclerque's 
musings about her growing preoccupation with St. Teresa, who, albeit in a 
contrasting manner, also evinced a kind of ecstatic union with God. Whereas 
Teresa's unity with the divine is apparently malleable and amourous, the 
Muslim woman is juxtaposed to her in Leclerque's mind as desirous of a fixed, 
determinate, and rigid union.  This picture of Teresa resists the old image of 
the mystic that Simone de Beauvoir perpetuates, as a woman who turns to 
worship of God when her human love is disappointed, and as a form of 
narcissism that seeks above all a sovereign gaze fixed attentively on her 
alone.4 While Kristeva’s depiction of Teresa is intellectual and nuanced, when 
she turns to describing nonwhite, Muslim women, racial stereotypes 
predominate.  When a man present compares the headscarved woman to St. 
Teresa, Leclerque exclaims "but it is completely different!"  She adds, to 
herself, without provocation, regarding the woman in the headscarf, "and 
should we deny her this 'identity,' she was quite prepared to sacrifice 
herself—like those female suicide bombers on the other side of the world, and 
soon, perhaps in our own suburbs."5   Here the image of the foreigner seems 
to reflect instead the paranoia of the bourgeois French subject.  Leclerque 
writes that what interests her in St. Teresa is specifically how her way of 
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thinking contrasts with those for whom the fragmentation of globalization has 
led to destructive fanaticism.  
Beauvoir judged mysticism to be one of the ways in which women justify 
remaining in immanence,6 but Kristeva appears to disagree.  In this paper I 
ask what difference Kristeva discerns between these two women, a distinction 
that apparently makes Teresa's immanence simultaneously a transcendence, 
but transforms a Muslim woman in a headscarf immediately into an imagined 
suicide bomber.  Relatedly, how does Adel the Middle Eastern artist, in 
Kristeva's mind, remain just this side of the animal even as he is able to 
sublimate?  Despite the problematic aspects of this comparison, we can learn 
something from them about Kristeva's ideas on mysticism and on art.  Both 
mysticism and art are products of the death drive, but whereas the suicide 
bomber and the animal directly and purely pursue death (again, on Kristeva's 
view) Teresa and Adel remain on its outer edge and merely play with 
mortality.   
I will begin by looking at "Adel's Body," followed by Teresa, My Love, in 
order to draw out these themes. In "Adel's Body" Kristeva discusses the artist's 
work using language that, while it recalls the description of the semiotic realm 
that is the theme of much of her early work, takes on a decidedly less psychic 
and more carnal dimension.  Here she repeatedly returns not only to semiotic 
drives and energies, but also to specific body parts.  She writes, "I feel (palper) 
the body of the work with my eye, as I could feel with my ear or tongue." The 
work of Adel opens itself up to a "carnal interpenetration" to which all 
contemporary art aspires.  This reaction is "the reciprocal reverse, in terms of 
reception, of the artistic act in terms of creation."  Adel is, in her words, the 
very incarnation of the "universal vocabulary of contemporary art," 
continually forming and reforming meaning, embodying the perpetual 
mobility of the foreigner.7  
The essay is dominated by animal images, partly because the artworks 
Kristeva is discussing feature animals, but also because she depicts Adel 
himself as an animal, provisionally formed as a flow of primal energy.  She 
writes that artists like Adel "succeed in lending meaning and form to their 
semiotic body."  The semiotic body is characterized by heterogeneity, "neither 
pure energy nor pure meaning," but rather "infused with a meaning that 
escapes the Ego and its language, yet echoes their logic."8   While everyone 
has a semiotic body,9 repressed or expressed as the person or work may have 
it, artists like Adel have an "unnameable energetic thrust that sways hither 
and thither" and "fastens on an element, an object, a person, an ambient 
situation, that calls to it and on which its vibrations chime or overflow."10  He 
is a "shout (cri)" whose works invite us to shout with him.11  His works present 
an "animal figurability of the self at the dawn of the self," a "complicity with 
animals."12  
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In one work, a mock Pieta, she writes that Abdessemed instantiates the 
baroque body in the self-portrait photograph in which he appears to be held 
up horizontally by his mother in the form of an almost cross.13  Maria 
Margaroni argues that for Kristeva the baroque body blurs the distinction 
between illusion and truth, appearance and reality, without confusing them; 
this feature renders the nature of sublimation and of art, by definition, 
baroque.14 Adel's is a specific kind of rehabilitation of the baroque body, one 
engendered by globalization, that is, at once Western and other, French and 
Arab.  His body is "ecstatic, schizophrenic, savage, civilized" and "driven by 
the eccentric force of refugees."  It is a purely "semiotic body," a "body without 
organs," the first term referring to her own early work identifying 
unconscious rhythms that inform symbolic language, and the second phrase, 
taken from Deleuze, referring to a body without any inherent organization, 
one which continually dismantles the organism, causing asignifying particles 
or pure intensities or energies to circulate.15  The purely semiotic body would 
not be translatable into propositional language.  Yet unlike the true 
schizophrenic, whose semiotic body remains mute, and who confounds 
words with things and loses their sense of reality, some traumatized 
individuals are able to give signification and form to their semiotic body, 
shaping a provisional crystallization in language, an ephemeral adoption of 
the codes of the community that surround them.  They seek not to 
communicate, but to express another intensity, an inchoate, singular desire, 
into terms that might be received by others, even while not capable of being 
transformed into a universal code.  Such is the artwork of Abdessemed, which 
Kristeva describes as composed of intensities and fragments that nonetheless 
signify.  She notes that what struck her first and foremost about him is his 
energy.16  
 Kristeva contrasts this language of intensities not only to symbolic 
language in which we search for recognition in socially communicable terms, 
but also to another, more destructive form of communication.  She considers 
Adel's work "Habibi" ("dear one", "loved one", in Arabic), a scaled-up replica 
of his own skeleton, seventeen meters long, hung horizontally from its spine.  
She then asks, with curiosity and no apparent connection, "would 
fundamentalist Islamists use this to send their kamikazes to blow their bones 
into the paradise of virgins?"  She interprets "Habibi" as a term of endearment 
addressed toward death that neither trivializes nor idealizes it.  In answer to 
her own question she writes, "On the contrary, the serene mortality traced by 
Adel's skeletons doesn't banalize death."17  To banalize death would be to 
understand the death drive literally as a drive to bring about the cessation of 
life, to kill or destroy.  The only reason to contrast Adel Abdessemed's art—
which, like that of other artists, including Van Gogh and Picasso among many 
others, makes use of skeletons—to the "art" of fundamentalist suicide 
bombers, is that Abdessemed comes from Algeria, a country that France 
colonized and to which its citizens bear an ambivalent attitude:  there are 
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"good" Arabs and dangerous ones, but both remain ineluctably non-white and 
non-European. 
 Although clearly there is some Eurocentric or anti-Arab bias present 
here, I don't want simply to point this out.  Kristeva argued in an earlier piece 
that religious fundamentalism, in particular Islamic religious 
fundamentalism, is nihilistic and adolescent in the sense that an eternal 
adolescent continues to believe in the ideal One, even after identifying with 
the symbolic phallic Other who is the object of the mother’s desire outside of 
her bond to the child.  If this initial investment "khred," which, as Kristeva 
explains, is the root of both credo, “I believe” and “credit” in an economic 
sense, has a weak link to the future subject who responds to it, the subject may 
turn to idealization rather than investment in an intersubjective bond.18  
Furthermore,  since recognition of and identification with this imaginary one 
in whom the mother has “invested” the symbolic identity of the child, 
eventually transforms the stammering of the child into linguistic signs, the 
subject's relation to language, rationality, and ethics may be compromised.  
Without recognition from or investment in this other, who stands for all 
others, the “I” cannot fully come into being.  The Third is a guarantor for the 
child of transition to a more stable, independent, and flexible, intersubjective 
identity. Kristeva describes the moment of successful investment as, fulfilling 
a “prereligious need to believe,” or a belief in the “God Logos.” The subject 
can only eventually become speaking and intersubjective if a “beloved 
authority” first acknowledges and receives their capacity for meaning, 
however inchoate it may initially be.19  Without a genuine response to the 
prereligious need to believe, the subject risks becoming susceptible to 
ideology. Thus sacred space is correlated with a meaningful psychic space, 
and in turn to a political space. Without a strong intersubjective, ethical other 
or set of others with whom to identify, the child turns instead to a single 
authority.  This fixed, determinate object of adherence takes the place of 
multiple energies of individual expression. The turn toward a fixed Great 
Other that cannot by definition disappoint characterizes adolescence, which 
can result, at its most extreme, in an unbinding of the death drive and 
complete separation from familial bonds.  Kristeva calls this a "triumph of 
evil," caused by the "ruthlessness of global migration" and its resulting 
disconnection among people.  It results ultimately in "blind destructivity and 
finally auto-destruction.”20 
Kristeva implies that Adel and his work exist just at the border of this 
possibility.  His "Habibi" hovers in proximity to, but not among, the abjection 
of death. Kristeva writes in Powers of Horror:  "The corpse, seen without God 
and outside of science, is the utmost of abjection. It is death infecting life."  
What causes abjection, however, has not so much to do with unhealthiness or 
lack of sanitation, as it has to do with lack of separation.  She writes that the 
abject "is something rejected from which one does not part, from which one 
does not protect oneself as from an object."  Because it is not separate from us 
4 8  |  A r t ,  M y s t i c i s m ,  a n d  t h e  O t h e r  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVI, No 2 (2018)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2018.857 
it "ends up engulfing us."  It "disturbs identity, system, order."  It does not 
respect borders or rules.21  This language, out of context, could almost 
describe the French attitude toward its north African immigrants.  Yet 
literature that plays with but does not display the abject is ground-breaking, 
just like the art of Adel.  Its very vicinity to abjection is what makes it 
revolutionary. 
Thus Adel's creativity is also an expression of the death drive. In Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle, Freud begins his discussion of the death drive with 
attention to the curious symptom of the compulsion to repeat, in which a 
traumatic event is relived over and over again, overriding the pleasure 
principle.  Although the death drive may most often manifest itself in ways 
that are directed inward by the subject upon itself, it is also evidenced by 
outward displays of aggression. Freud posits that the death drive manifests 
the organism's urge to restore as much as possible an earlier state of things, 
one characterized by an utter lack of stimulation.22  Outbursts of aggressive 
energy can be seen as aspects of the death drive which, "under the influence 
of other narcissistic libido, have been forced away from the ego" and thus 
emerge only in relation to an object.23 In the case of sublimation, the death 
drive is exposed through a transformation of eros.  According to Kristeva's 
theory, the thinking process itself is founded by sublimation, as significance 
(the relation between representation, language, and thought) structures all of 
the other psychic processes.24 
There is a close relationship, then, between the structure of thought and 
the aggressive animal-like outbursts Kristeva returns to in contrasting them 
(but still keeping them close) to both Adel and Teresa.  The initial sublimation 
that opens up the possibility of thought must be thought of in terms of an 
initial investment, the "belief in the God Logos."  In Teresa, My Love, Kristeva 
writes:  "If, before and after becoming the I of cogitation, I is a fantasizing 
subject, and if I fantasize the ideal and/or dead Father, this means that I am 
owed at once to a desire and its frustration, a beginning and a sublimation 
together."  The "owe" here, again a financial metaphor, is the credit that has 
been extended to me, one that necessitates an acknowledgement of lack, the 
substitution of logos for the full satisfaction of desire.  For Kristeva, this 
anguish in acknowledging the impossibility of of fulfillment of desire is 
Christianity's "own special truth." Without the fantasy of the Father who 
promises that "all will be sorted out in the fullness of time," a fantasy that is 
both of the ideal Father (god the father) and the dead Father (Christ), "you 
will…be deprived of the imaginary itself….  You are left to tick over in the 
realm of calculating, operational thinking.  You become superhuman, you 
start somatizing, or you sign up as a suicide bomber."25  
How is it that a suicide bomber is "deprived of the imaginary"?  Kristeva 
seems to be alluding here to the prohibition on images of the divine in Islam   
In contrast to this absence of images, the sacred, she writes in The Severed Head, 
"turns out to reside not in sacrifice after all, or in some aesthetic or religious 
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tradition, but in that specifically human, unique, and bitter experience that is 
the capacity for representation."26  Although she does not link this capacity to 
any particular religious tradition, at the same time, she does remark that in 
Christianity, Jesus says "there is but one desire that counts, the desire for the 
name, for the representation of meaning,"27 for "representation-verbalization-
sublimation."28  Teresa "introduces the sensible into the intellectual in order 
to weave a third space, that of those 'intellectual visions' whose task it is to 
rename and rewrite the felt experience of an invisible overcoming and 
dispossession."29  This "sensible intellectual" is what distinguishes Adel and 
Teresa from the suicide bomber, in Kristeva's view.  This "third way" is 
distinguished from the intellect by comparing thought to the "imaginative 
faculty."  It is thus a kind of reflection in and through the image. By contrast, 
and even more troubling, she compares Hell to a place with "no images."30  
Where Kristeva makes a mistake is in overlooking the fact that it is not 
just Christianity, but also Islam, that recounts this "betrothal of imagination 
and understanding."31  The Islamic theologian Al-Farabi, too, linked prophecy 
to the imagination, so that it is not an absolutely iconoclastic religion. 
Moreover, Kristeva herself, in Crisis of the (European) Subject connected a 
modified form of iconoclasm with the possibility of unfreezing the 
symbolically congealed nature of Christianity.32   
Kristeva is correct in her analysis of the vulnerability of "adolescent" 
believers to the call of ideology, as far as it goes.  North African and Arab 
immigrants have not been recognized as full members of the social contract 
in France.  And religion may be a place to turn in order to feel a sense of 
recognition and power.  But to argue that religion is merely a "private matter," 
as Kristeva, through her alter ego Sylvia Leclerque, declares at the beginning 
of Teresa, My Love,33 is to overlook its role as a substitute when a sensus 
communis is missing.  As I have argued elsewhere, following Kristeva but 
pointing out her omission of the political aspect of the "suburban troubles" in 
France, without recognition and full place in the public sphere it is impossible 
to get beyond "adolescence."34 
The description of religion as private is also curious given Kristeva's own 
efforts to "privately" address the lack of a loving Third to which the adolescent 
might turn.  Rather than a public solution that would address laws and 
institutions that affect youth prone to radicalization, Kristeva has recently 
been involved in an intercultural and interdisciplinary team effort, in 
conjunction with caregivers from the Hôpital Cochin, which addresses the 
suffering of individuals attracted to radicalization through psychoanalysis, 
play, and exposure to literature, philosophy, and Western culture.  Kristeva 
calls it "lacework":  delicate, painstaking, slow, finely attuned to the 
individual.35   
In Teresa, My Love, Kristeva writes a fictional story about a woman 
obsessed with another kind of religious practice, namely, Saint Teresa.  Silvia 
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Leclerque, Kristeva's alter ego, compares Teresa's mysticism to a vessel that 
"by contrast with the average suicide bomber," is a size that is "commensurate 
with what [God] wishes to pour into it," loving and not calling her to die or 
"blow [herself] up."36  To be spiritual in this balanced sense is to open oneself 
up to the divine not as something that overwhelms, but as something that fills 
just the vessel that oneself is.  To do so is to "love" and not to immolate oneself.  
Again, the reference is to the death drive which, when properly 
commensurate with the erotic or life drive, transforms desire into the 
jouissance of the divine father located at the "junction between flesh and 
word.37  When death overwhelms love, the result is self-destructive and 
destructive of others.  Teresa, by contrast, is "made for dying of desire."38  
Kristeva writes, quoting Francisco de Borja, that Teresa is "seized by a strong 
desire to live a bodily life while at the same time longing to be delivered of 
the prison of the body in order to be united with God."39 This oscillation at 
the edge of a binary opposition renders Teresa capable of jouissance, accessed 
through "representation-verbalization-sublimation" between the world and 
the beyond.40  
Likewise, Christianity, Teresa's religion, exists in the anguish at the 
border between the fantasy of the ideal father and that of the dead father.  In 
Freud's Totem and Taboo, the destruction of the primal horde of brothers who 
band together in order to kill their father is the condition for the formation of 
a society in the name of the law.41  For Kristeva, what is created in Teresa's 
case is not a firm symbolic register but a realm of possible representation, one 
that does not even need to be definitively pictorial in nature, the "sensible 
intellectual" that is at the origin of meaning.  
Kristeva also writes that Christianity was "ingenious" for appropriating 
the fantasy, described in Freud, of a child being beaten.  Jesus is a human, like 
us, who is beaten to death by the father, but then comes back to life.42  Both 
boys and girls have this unconscious fantasy; for girls, it arises from seeing 
boys get corporal punishment, which they internalize as the inversion of the 
forbidden love for the father into the punishment of the envied rival, the boy.  
For boys, the unconscious fantasy is of being beaten by the mother, and is to 
trigger the anxiety that pushes them away from incestuous love toward 
identification with the father.  In either case, acts of representation—speech 
and image—become a transcendence of sadomasochism toward expression 
and appeasement.43  Each of us is, Kristeva writes: 
 the result of a prolonged 'work of the negative': birth, 
weaning, separations, frustrations, bereavements.  By 
staging this rupture at the heart of the absolute subject that 
is Christ…Christianity brings back into consciousness the 
dramas inherent in our becoming, thus endowing it with an 
immense, unconscious, cathartic power.44  
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Both Teresa and the "Islamists" are driven by their faith, what Leclerque 
calls their "'hair in the soup'…that makes a person ill with love, ill unto death" 
in different manners.45  Whereas Teresa's faith leads to an unprecedented 
sensuality, to "imaginative visions" that are "inscribed in the very interior part 
of the soul,"46 however, the suicide bombers believe that "He (the Almighty, 
the One and Only, the True, the Beyond) has mutated into pure spectacle, and 
twist their alleged faith into murderous nihilism."47  On this interpretation 
Islamic fundamentalism is the other side of global capitalism.  Such an 
analysis has promise.  Yet Kristeva does not go the further step to advocate a 
new kind of community or political vision in which people unmoored from 
any loving Third could see themselves reflected.  Instead, she writes that such:  
dangerous maniacs of the virtual Absolute" are not really 
that scary.  Indeed, "their fundamentalist rage would be 
defused if they just read [Cervantes] instead of burning 
flags, embassies, and Danish cartoons.  And he could 
detoxify the rest. I know, there's a long way to go—fanatics 
are no good at reading, or laughing, and the inner halls of 
my nuanced Teresa would be way about their heads.  What 
would it take?  Nobody knows, not even me.  Missionaries? 
Believers? Educators? Committted people opening up 
spaces for reading and writing? People daring to analyze 
the 'fundament,' to renew it?  Maybe some of that will 
happen eventually.48  
Kristeva's reference is to Don Quixote, as she imagines some righteous 
thinkers of the West tilting at the endless, unfindable "windmills" of 
"chimeras, TV soap operas for avid women and their partners. Or God's 
madmen, the suicide bombers."49  She allows that "we'd do better to change 
the wind than sit in judgment on the windmills."50  The death of the Father 
represented by kenosis and the death of Christ has, Kristeva writes, "thrown 
open the possibility of another psychic upheaval" than the one represented by 
sadomasochistic fantasies. This is the abolition of paternal (national) authority 
itself, which has happened in many non-European countries, "with all the 
attendant risks of mental, social, not to say biological disorders, some of which 
are already to be glimpsed amid the globalized desolation of the world."51 
This desolation also manifests itself in the "suburban troubles" of France to 
which Kristeva frequently alludes. 
These passages also make reference to the work in which Kristeva has 
been engaging at the Hôpital Cochin, working individually with youth 
perceived to be vulnerable to the appeal of fundamentalist Islamic rhetoric.  
Admirable as such efforts are, they ignore the fact that the basis of much 
radical Islam is in fact intellectual, even drawing on Western philosophy, 
including Marxism, critical theory, and the analytic philosophy of science, 
and "fanatics" are not necessarily "no good at reading."52  Educating Islamic 
thinkers by exposing them to Cervantes, Proust, and St.Teresa might bear fruit 
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in the case of some individuals, but it is not a systemic, structural solution.  
Even if we invent countless specific, individual versions of "loving 
intelligence" to replace God,53 this effort can only be successful in a society 
where all mutually recognize each other. 
In the final chapter of The Severed Head, Kristeva discusses the death mask 
as an image of the "paralyzed limit" of "the threat or promise of the 
invisible."54 The sensible intellectual hovers at the edge of the visible/invisible 
divide.  She compares the artist to those of us who, immersed in the 
"spectacle" that is the contemporary realm of the reproducible image, exist 
within an economy of the visible fully figured for us in advance.  Some artists 
at the inception of modern art, by contrast, "allow themselves to believe only 
in their own way of figuring the economy of bodies and of being."  This belief 
allows them to "abandon the spectacle, infiltrate the borders of appearances, 
and find there a kind of face that has not yet found its face, that never will, but 
that never stops seeking a thousand and one ways of seeing."  Such an act 
makes Adel and Teresa "sensual seekers of the visible incarnation."55  
Contrasted to this fantasy of seeking another face is a vision of the human 
with no head at all, Bataille's Acéphale, who "escaped his head like a prisoner 
escapes prison," becoming "a being who does not know prohibition."56  And 
at the other side of this ruleless headlessness lies what Kristeva calls the 
"sacrificed, decapitated, immured woman."  The other phrase she uses for this 
woman is "chador."57 Without belaboring the point too much, it is important 
to recognize that Kristeva's main point is not to bash Islam; nevertheless, her 
repeated juxtaposition of the "proper" contours of sacred space—which is 
most often linked with incarnation and the "capacity for representation" that 
she associates with Christianity—with suicide bombers and women in 
chadors, those uncomfortable non-white bodies infiltrating rational, French 
society, is notable and uncomfortable.   
The most glaring omission in this part of Kristeva's analysis of the failure 
of the need to believe, then, is the surprising lack of connection of her critique 
of terrorism to the absence of a sensus communis or political space for action.  
Although she relates Adel's ability to sublimate to the idea of the image as a 
secularization of the sacred, she fails to observe, as I think Arendt would have, 
that the capacity for making a sacred space, in order to become fully 
actualized, must necessarily be correlated to a political space.  Although 
Kristeva repeatedly criticizes the global society of the spectacle in which we 
all exist, she does not account for the differing responses to this unmooring 
from a meaningful "sacred space" in a political manner, but only as a personal 
choice.  Adel, as an artist fully integrated into French and international artistic 
circles, does not find himself without an intersubjective mirror in which to be 
reflected back to himself as a part of a polis.  The others to whom Kristeva 
compares him, namely suicide bombers or Islamic fundamentalists, but also 
the vast majority of noncriminal, nonfanatic, rootless victims of colonization 
and globalization, lack this mirror. 
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An interlocutor in the novel says to Sylvia, "sacred space is fast turning 
into a desert, isn't it!"  Sylvia responds:  "What space?... Teresa tears us all 
away from our spaces, from space itself, to deposit us in time."58  The inner 
sense that Teresa fosters is psychic, not political space.  Yet just like Adel she 
has another, outer space ready, be it that of the convent, the family, or the city, 
one which supports and respects her psychic space.  What is involved in the 
image as a sacred space?  Recall again the image of the audience coming out 
of a concert.  Each has incorporated the work in her own singular fashion, and 
yet, they come together and communicate about it.59  But what if your 
language is not heard or comprehended?  Surely psychic space is crucial, but 
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